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The Possibility of
Reverfer in Colorado
By CHARLES MELVIN NEFF*
INTRODUCTION
1. In Colorado an owner of real estate has the legal right to
transfer it to another either absolutely or conditionally.
2. Possibility of reverter defined.
3. Importance of the doctrine.
4. The language used to create the estate.
5. The right of possibility of reverter contrasted with right of
re-entry.
6. Rule against perpetuities.
7. The grantee of such an estate is accorded all the attributes of
an owner in fee simple as long as the condition is not broken.
8. Rights remaining in grantor after grant upon a conditional
limitation. This is the case of a true right of possibility of reverter.
9. Alienation inter vivos.
10. Release will accomplish an alienation to the grantee.
11. The estate remaining in the grantor after a grant of realty
upon a condition subsequent and its alienability.
12. The quantity cf the estate or interest remaining in the grantor
and that estate or interest transferred to the grantee, by the creation of
the possibility of reverter, is determined by the method by which the
transfer is made.
(a) Grant of rights of way by Congress.
(b) Rights of way obtained by condemnation.
(c) Rights of way obtained by voluntary sale and purchase.
(d) Warranty deeds under Acts of Congress.
13. Procedure indicated upon breach of the condition.
*Of the Denver Bar.
DICTA
I. In Colorado an owner of real estate has the legal right to trans-
fer it to another either absolutely or conditionally. Thus it was stated
by the Colorado Supreme Court, in its opinion delivered in Fusha, et al.
v. Dacona Town Site Company (Dec., 1915), 60 Colo. 315, 153 Pac.
226, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 108:
"It is an elementary principle of law that every owner of real
estate, in fee simple, has the legal right to dispose of it either absolutely
or conditionally, or to regulate the manner in which the same shall be
used and occupied as he may deem best and proper, provided, however,
that the conditions and restrictions imposed are not violative of the pub-
lic good or subversive of the public interests. Therefore, if conditions
in a deed are made in good faith for a valuable consideration and nothing
malum in se or malum prohibiturn is stipulated for, they do not contra-
vene public policy and should be enforced."
2. Possibility of reverter defined: Possibility of reverter must be
distinguished from "reverter" and from "reversion.." Challis on Real
Property (1911), 3rd edition by Sweet, page 82, says: "Reverter and
reversion are synonymous terms denoting an estate vested in interest
though not in possession; but the word reverter is sometimes loosely
used to denote what is properly styled possibility of reverter." He also
says: "Possibility of reverter denotes no estate, but, as the name implies,
only a possibility to have an estate at a future time." See page 83 of
Challis. Thompson on Real Property, Vol. 4, Permanent Edition, sec-
tion 2182, correctly says: "The possibility of reverter, after the termina-
tion of a fee conditional, being a mere possibility, is not an estate (citing
many cases), and may be defeated by statutory enactment." Citing
Union Colony Co. v. Gallie (1939), 104 Colo. 46, 88 Pac. (2d) 120.
"An estate in fee simple determinable sometimes referred to as a base
or qualified fee, is created by any limitation which, in an otherwise effec-
tive conveyance of land, creates an estate in fee simple, and provides that
the estate shall automatically expire upon the occurrence of a stated
event." Tiffany Real Property, 3rd edition, volume 1, section 220, also
saying: "This is the clear and satisfactory statement given in Restate-
ment, Property, Section 44," and citing, among other cases, Burlington
& C. R. Co. v. Colorado Eastern R. Co. (1906), 38 Colo. 95, 88
Pac. 154.
A possibility of reverter is defined in the Restatement of Property
as any reversionary interest which is subject to a condition precedent.
See Restatement, Property, section 154 (3). This is a much narrower
definition than that indicated by the decisions of the courts. For in-
stance, the phrase possibility of reverter may refer to a situation creating
a conditional limitation, as in Board of Commissioners of El Paso
County, et al. v. City of Colorado Springs (1919), 66 Colo. 111, 180
Pac. 301, or to a situation creating a condition subsequent and hence
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creating a contingent right of re-entry, Union Colony v. Gallie (1939),
104 Colo. 46, 88 Pac. (2d) 120, again to cases where a conditional fee
was created, Lytle v. Hulen (1929), 128 Ore. 483, 275 Pac. 45, 114
A. L. R. Ann. 587, and to those cases wherein a so-called "easement"
only was granted. Lithgow v. Pearson (1913), 25 Colo. App. 70, 135
Pac. 759: Burlington & C. R. R. Co. v. Colo. & Eastern R. Co. (1906),
38 Colo. 95, 88 Pac. 154. The able author of the note in 109 A. L. R.
Ann. 1148 calls attention to this confusion and makes the following
comment:
"An estate on a limitation or on a conditional limitation, some-
times called a 'condition in law,' a 'collateral limitation,' or a 'determin-
able fee,' is one which is to continue during the existence of a certain
state of circumstances, and subject to be terminated by a cessation of, or
a change in, such state of circumstances. A condition subsequent oper-
ates on an estate already created and vested, rendering it liable to be
defeated if the condition is broken. The distinction between an estate
on a conditional limitation and one subject to a condition subsequent is
that in the former the words creating it limit the continuation of the
estate to the time preceding and happening of the contingency, while in
the latter the words creating the condition do not originally limit thE
term, but merely permit its termination upon the happening of the con-
tingency. The interest remaining in the grantor upon a conveyance of
the fee, either on a conditional limitation, or subject to a condition sub-
sequent is usually treated as a possibility of reverter, although in the
latter case it is merely a possible right of re-entry. The possibility of
reverter in the former case is similar to, but not quite identical with, the
possibility of reverter in the latter case. It is the possibility that the land
may revert to the grantor when the granted estate determines, and repre-
sents whatever is not conveyed by the deed. All the estate is, in either
case, in the grantee until the happening of the contingency." Annota-
tion in 109 A. L. R. at page 1149.
If on the facts the court holds the grantor has a mere right possi-
bility of reverter, in contradistinEtion to a right of re-entry, following a
condition subsequent, then it will declare that when the condition is
broken, ips o facto and without any action on the grantor's part, the
grantor is at once automatically reinvested with the title. Cowell v.
Colorado Springs (1876), 3 Colorado 82, 100 U. S. 50 (selling of
intoxicating liquors-on the place) ; Burlington & C. R. Co. v. Colorado
Eastern R. Co. (1906), 38 Colo. 95, 88 Pac. 154 (grant on the limi-
tation that on the final abandonment of a right of way for a ditch the
right granted to maintain such ditch should cease and revert to the grant-
ors construed as a limitation and not as a condition subsequent) ; Board
of Commissioners of El Paso County, et al. u. City of Colorado Springs
(1919), 66 Colo. 111, 180 Pac. 301 (provisions in the deed that no
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intoxicating liquor be sold on the premises, that if the lot or any part of
it be used otherwise than for the purposes of building and maintaining a
courthouse thereon that the part not used for courthouse be kept and
maintained as a public park). On the other hand, where title to land is
conveyed upon a condition the court will hold the failure subsequent to
perform the condition does not divest the title. "The title is divested
only upon the entry of the grantor or his heirs for the condition broken,
or by a suit for the recovery of possession, or other act equivalent to an
entry. The possibility of reverter merely is not an estate in land, and
until the contingency of the condition happens the whole title is in the
grantee, and the grantor has nothing he can convey." Thompson, Real
Property, Permanent Edition, Vol. 4, section 2129, citing among many
authorities the cases of Denver & S. F. R. Co. t. School District (1890),
14 Colo. 327, 23 Pac. 978; Union Colony v. Gallie (1939), 104 Colo.
46, 88 Pac. (2d) .120.
This difference between the right of possibility of reverter and this
contingent right of re-entry upon breach of a condition subsequent is a
very important matter to remember in passing upon Colorado titles. If
the title examiner finds there has been a breach of the condition in the
first situation he then must find title to be in the grantor, but he cannot
find title in the grantor in the second situation unless and until the
grantor has made a re-entry or its equivalent.
"The difference is quite material," said the court in Owen v. Field
(1869), 102 Mass. 90, cited as authority and with approval in B. &
Colo. R. R. Co. v. Colo. Eastern R. R. Co. (1906), 38 Colo. 95, 88
Pac. 1.54. This is brought out clearly in Owen v. Field (1869), 102
Mass. 90, wherein an owner of land by an indenture granted to K and
his heirs "the whole use" of certain springs on the owner's land with the
right to lay pipes to conduct the water to a distant town. It also pro-
vided that if K should cease for a whole year to deliver water in the main
pipe that then the indenture was to cease and be of no effect. The court
held that the indenture conveyed to K no ownership of the soil in the
land but only "an easement," terminable at the pleasure of the grantees
by a non-user for the term of one year. The last clause of the indenture
should be c6nstrued, not as a condition subsequent, but as a limitation.
The difference is quite material. 'A limitation doth always determine the
estate without entry or zlaim, and so doth not a condition.' Also, 'a
stranger may take advantage of an estate determined by limitation, and
so he cannot upon condition.' Shep. Touch. 121. 'The apt and proper
words to make a limitation of an estate are quamdiu, dum' etc.; and in
this case the word 'if,' although used in the grant, is not sufficient of
itself to render it a grant defeasible on condition subsequent. The sub-
stance of the clause is not the forfeiture of a right, but the termination of
an onerous and unprofitable obligation." See page 105.
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3. Importance of the doctrine: The doctrine of the possibility of
reverter may seem at first sight to be a relatively unimportant doctrine
in the law of real property. The fact is, however, that in the examina-
tion of titles it often becomes a doctrine of considerable importance. This
will be especially true if the land conveyed should afterwards be found
to contain oil, gas, coal, lead, gold, or other fluid or fixed minerals in
valuable commercial quantities, or the land may, through change of cir-
cumstances, acquire additional and considerable commercial value. On
the oil and gas phase see Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Thompson (1939),
106 Fed. (2d) 217. It is evident that if the deed conveys a fee simple
title, though subject to the possibility of reverter, the grantee, its succes-
sors and assigns would have the right to exploit thereon for oil and gas.
4. The language used to create the estate: In Tiffany, Real Property,
3rd edition, volume I, section 220, at page 385, it is said: "No set form-
ula is necessary for the creation of the limitation, any words expressive
of the grantor's intent that the estate shall terminate on the occurrence
of the event being sufficient:" and in note 86 reference is made to "Re-
statement, Property, section 44, comment 1. The matter, however, can-
not be dismissed so shortly. It is true that the courts will endeavor to
carry out the intent of the grantor, but that intent must be ascertained
from the language used as interpreted by the court. Furthermore, in
drafting the instrument a distinction must be made between the right of
possibility of reverter arising out of a conditional limitation and those
other types of right of possibility of reverter arising out of a condition
subsequent, so called easements, etc. See the Attorney General vs. Merri-
mack Mfg. Co. (1860), 14 Gray (80 Mass.) 586." This case is so
important on this point that it is given almost in full.
In Attorney General v. Merrimack Manufacturing Co. (1860), 14
Gray 586, 80 Mass. 586, we have an action by the Attorney General
"for the establishment and execution of a charity in a church lot in
Lowell and the church and parsonage thereon standing, and to recover
the price paid by the relators" (rector, wardens and vestrymen of St.
Anne's Church) "for the church."
On the 3rd of May, 1826, the Merrimack Manufacturing Com-
pany, a community developing company, sold to the Proprietors of the
Locks and Canals on the Merrimack River, a corporation, certain prop-
erty including the church lot, and, on the same day, the Proprietors etc.,
by a separate deed, "in consideration of one dollar" "and for the purpose
of supporting divine worship," re-conveyed the church lot, the church
and the parsonage to the Merrimack Company, "their successors and
assigns forever, sq long as they shall use or permit the same to be used
and appropriated to divine worship and for a residence of the minister of
the gospel, and no longer"; * * * "but upon failure thereof the said
Proprietors, and their successors and assigns, may reenter upon the prem-
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ises, remove and expel the tenants and occupiers thereof, take and keep
seisin and possession thereof to their own use and benefit in fee simple,
and be and become seised and possessed thereof, as of their former
estate."
On May 22, 1830, the Proprietors made a deed of release to the
Merrimack Company, reciting the last named deed of May 3, 1826, for
a consideration of ten dollars, forever releasing to the company, their
successors and assigns, the provisions and conditions expressed and con-
tained in the deed aforesaid so that the company, their successors and
assigns shall have, possess and enjoy the premises free of all conditions,
to their own use and behoof forever.
The argument for the relators was that-by the deed of May 3, 1826,
the Proprietors conveyed a base or qualified fee to the respondents, and
that the fee became vested in the respondents, with a mere possibility of
reverter to the grantors if the use should cease and the limitation take
effect. The words used are express words of limitation-"so long as,"
"quamdiu," "dummodo"-and cannot be held to create a condition,
especially in a conveyance in fee.
The court held that the words did not create a trust or a limitation
but did create an estate upon condition, which estate was made absolute
by the subsequent release from the grantors. The court distinguished
between an estate upon condition and an estate limited in the following
words (see pp. 611-61 2 ) :
"It is perhaps hardly material to determine whether the
clauses in the deed which refer to the appropriation of the land to
certain uses, and fix the rights of the parties in case such appropria-
tion should cease, are to be construed as creating a limitation, or a
condition, if it should appear that no trust was established; because
the deed of release of the Proprietors of the Locks and Canals of
May 22d 1830, by which all 'the provisions and conditions' in
the former deed were released to the respondents, would seem to be
clearly sufficient to perfect their title, and to extinguish the interest
of the Proprietors of the Locks and Canals, whether that interest
were regarded as a right to reenter for breach of a condition, or a
possibility of reverter upon the happening of the event which con-
stituted the limitation. And the court are all of the opinion, for
reasons substantially like those which have been given in consider-
ing the question of dedication, and from a careful examination of
the terms of the deed, that no trust was intended by the parties, or
constituted by the conveyance. The Proprietors of the Locks
and Canals, in their relations to the new community, which became
the city of Lowell, and in their objects and motives for providing
for the support of public worship, were substantially the successors
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of the Merrimack Manufacturing Company. The words 'in trust'
are not found in the deed, although they are the usual and well
known phrase when the creation of a trust is designed; and we
think there is nothing in the circumstances or relations of the par-
ties to show that they contemplated a beneficial interest in the
estate to be enjoyed by any individual or corporate body, or by the
public at large, beyond their own administration and control. And
although there are apt words in the deed to create a limitation, and
sufficient for that purpose if they stood alone, we think that all its
parts taken together do create an estate upon condition, and that
by such a construction every portion of the deed is made effective,
and its obvious purposes are most completely executed.
"The distinction between an estate upon condition, and the
limitation by which an estate is determined upon the happening
of some event is, that in the latter case the estate reverts to the
grantor, or passes to the person to whom it is granted by limitation
over, upon the mere happening of the event upon which it is lim-
ited, without any entry or other act; while in the former the reser-
vation can only be made to the grantor or his heirs, and an entry
upon breach of the condition is requisite to revest the estate. The
provision for reentry is therefore the distinctive characteristic of
an estate upon condition; and when it is found that by any form
of expression the grantor has reserved the right, upon the happen-
ing of any event, to reenter, and thereby revest in himself his former
estate, it may be construed as such. Shep. Touch. 121, 122. Lit.
§§ 329, 330. 4 Cruise Dig. title 32, c. 25. 4 Kent Com. (6th
ed.) 125, 126. The words 'provided,' 'so that,' and 'upon condi-
tion that,' are the usual words to make a condition; but to say that
if a certain event happen the grantor may reenter, is equally effec-
tual. And the reason of this rule of construction is, that the stipu-
lation for a right of reentry would be senseless if the deed were
construed to create a limitation; because the estate vesting upon the
mere happening of the event, the right to enter would of course
follow with all other rights of ownership."
These provisions in the deed are construed as limitations and not as
conditions subsequent. The rule is clearly and expressly stated in Bur-
lington & C. R. Co. v. Colorado Eastern R. Co. (1906), supra, as
follows:
"As will be observed, it was expressly provided in the Gerspach
deed to Sigler 1& Co. that upon the happening of a certain contingency,
to wit, the final abandonment of the right of way for the purposes
therein set forth, then the rights granted should cease and revert to the
respective parties of the first part. This clause in the deed should be
construed as a limitation, and not as a condition subsequent, and, there-
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fore, upon the happening of the event provided, the control and use of
the land would pass to the owner of the fee without entry or claim.
Owen v. Field, 102 Mass. 90; Mitchell v. Bourbon County, 76 S. W.
16. It appears from the evidence that before the ouster complained of
the ditch had been entirely abandoned. It follows that the title to the
strip of land then held by the appellee was at that time freed and cleared
of any and all rights theretofore granted to the Sigler Company."
The simplest set of facts suggesting possibility of reverter are those
found in an Ohio case. A grantor, for a valuable consideration, con-
veyed by deed the title to a lot to the trustees of a church. The haben-
dum clause barred the title from returning to the grantor or his heirs
"so long as said lot is held and used for church purposes." That was
all there was in the transaction. The habendum clause did not add to
the quoted words the phrase "and no longer," nor did the deed contain
a provision for reverter, or grant a right of re-entry. The court held no
possibility of reverter was created.
The Ohio case referred to is the "Matter of Copps Chapel Metho-
dist Episcopal Church (April, 1929), 120 Ohio State 309, 166 N. E.
218, wherein the owner of a lot, by a deed conveyed the same, for a
valuable consideration, to the trustees of the church. The habendum
clause read as follows:
"To have and to hold the premises aforesaid unto the said
grantees and their successors so that neither the said grantor or his
heirs nor any other person claiming title through or under him
shall or will hereafter claim or demand any right or title to the
premises or any part thereof; but they and every one of them shall
by these presents be excluded and forever barred so long as said lot
is held and used for church purposes."
The deed contained no provision for forfeiture or reversion, nor
provision for re-eantry upon condition broken.
After the deed was executed the trustees erected upon the lot a
church building.
In due course of time the trustees abandoned the use of the prem-
ises for church purposes and petitioned the court for an order authorizing
it to sell the building. The heirs of the grantor of the lot claimed the
church building as an appurtenance to the land, on the theory that upon
a disuse of the premises for the purposes for which it was granted, the
title to the lot and its appurtenance, the church building, reverted to the
grantor's heirs.
The court decided that even though no longer used for church pur-
poses, the lot and the church building belonged to the trustees and not to
the heirs of the grantor. (Continued in May Issue)
